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IS COERCION NECESSARY FOR LAW?  
THE ROLE OF COERCION IN INTERNATIONAL 
AND DOMESTIC LAW 
SANDRA RAPONI

 
ABSTRACT 
Critics of international law argue that it is not really law because it 
lacks a supranational system of coercive sanctions. International legal 
scholars and lawyers primarily refute this by demonstrating that 
international law is in fact enforced, albeit in decentralized and less 
coercive ways. I will focus instead on the presumption behind this 
skeptical view—the idea that law must be coercively enforced. First, I 
argue that coercive enforcement is not conceptually necessary for law or 
legal obligations. Second, I consider the claim that coercive enforcement 
is nonetheless necessary for instrumental reasons. I argue that while 
physical coercion is instrumentally useful for increasing compliance in the 
domestic case, this is less effective and more problematic in the 
international case. What then is essential and distinctive about law, and 
what would increase the effectiveness of international law? First, 
international law needs to be generally accepted as binding by states, 
officials, and other agents; and second, international legal rules should be 
determinatively interpreted and applied by authoritative, adjudicative, and 
administrative institutions.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2009, the American Society of International Law organized a panel 
at its annual meeting to discuss the question, “is international law law?” 
While many international legal scholars were frustrated with having to 
discuss this question and instead wanted to focus on how international law 
affects state behavior, Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro argue that the 
question of whether international law is law still matters a great deal.
1
 I 
agree. Given that legal systems are morally valuable institutions, whether 
states and other agents ought to respect, support, or obey international law 
depends in part on whether it is considered to be real law.
2
 Reflecting on 
this question can expand our understanding of the nature of law in the 
domestic case as well.  
Those who continue to present the skeptical view that international law 
is not “law” often take the important features of domestic legal systems 
within modern states as paradigmatic of law and then apply this 
conception of law to the global level.
3
 International law fails to satisfy this 
model since it does not have a world government that can make law and 
enforce these laws through a supranational system of sanctions, such as an 
independent international military force. 
Creating a coercive world government raises important practical and 
normative difficulties. First, it seems unlikely that states would agree to 
relinquish enough of their military resources and personnel to the control 
of a world government. And second, even if a coercive world government 
could be created, there are good reasons to doubt whether it would 
function in democratic and legitimate ways. John Rawls agreed with Kant 
that a world state (“a unified political regime with the legal powers 
normally exercised by central governments”) would either be a global 
 
 
 1. Oona Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and International 
Law, 121 YALE L.J. 252, 255 (2011). 
 2. Id. 
 3. This model is supported by modern social theory. Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and 
Immanuel Kant argue that a lawful condition in which rights can be secured requires a supreme 
sovereign with centralized legislative power that makes law, a centralized adjudicative power that 
interprets and applies the law to particular cases, and a centralized coercive power that enforces the 
law through sanctions. Based on this view, some contemporary scholars argue that a world state with 
these three features is required for a lawful condition at the international level.  
 For example, the following scholars argue for a coercive world state based on Kant’s legal theory: 
B. Sharon Byrd & Joachim Hruschka, From the State of Nature to the Juridical State of States, 27.6 L. 
& PHILOSOPHY: AN INT’L J. FOR JURISPRUDENCE & LEGAL PHIL. 599 (2008). B. SHARON BYRD & 
HRUSCHKA, JOACHIM, KANT’S DOCTRINE OF RIGHT: A COMMENTARY (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012); OTFRIED HOFFE, KANT’S COSMOPOLITAN THEORY OF LAW AND PEACE 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol8/iss1/2
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despotism or would rule over a fragile empire torn by frequent civil strife 
as different peoples tried to regain their autonomy.
4 
Given these concerns, 
it is important to consider how international society can be governed by 
law without a coercive world government.  
In this Article, I will focus on the issue of coercive enforcement and the 
skeptical argument that since international law is not effectively enforced 
against states by a supranational system of coercive sanctions, it is not real 
law. I will use the term “coercive enforcement” to refer to the use of force 
or the threat of sanctions to increase compliance with the law.
5
 As 
Hathaway and Shapiro note, this seems to be the principle objection made 
by critics.
6
 This objection may seem persuasive since a distinctive feature 
of legal rules within domestic legal systems appears to be the fact that, 
unlike moral rules, they can be coercively enforced by political 
institutions. While most legal philosophers largely agree with H.L.A. 
Hart’s persuasive rejection of John Austin’s command theory of law, the 
view that sanctions are a necessary, central, and distinguishing feature of 
law still persists, particularly outside legal philosophy.
7
  
There are two main responses to the skeptical view. First, one can show 
that international law is sufficiently enforced without a world government 
 
 
 4. JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 36 (1999).  
 5. This is the traditional conception of legal coercion in law and political theory. Others have 
proposed other views of coercion in law. For example, Ekow N. Yankah argues that we should not 
conflate the coerciveness of law with the idea that law is backed by the threat of sanctions. He argues 
that “coercion occurs when sufficiently high pressure is applied to compel the adoption of a certain 
course of action.” Ekow N. Yankah, The Force of Law: The Role of Coercion in Legal Norms, 42 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 1195, 1216–17 (2008). Scott Anderson argues that the “enforcement approach” to 
coercion, which focuses on the coercer’s ability to inhibit actions by the use of force or threat of force, 
is a superior way to understand coercion and a more fundamental way to understand coercion in 
political, moral and legal philosophy than the “pressure approach.” Scott A. Anderson, The 
Enforcement Approach to Coercion, 5 J. ETHICS & SOC. PHIL. 1 (2010).  
 6. Hathaway & Shapiro, supra note 1, at 255–56. They cite Anthony D’Amato’s description of 
this objection amongst students of law:  
Many serious students of the law react with a sort of indulgence when they encounter the term 
“international law,” as if to say, “well, we know it isn’t really law, but we know that 
international lawyers and scholars have a vested professional interest in calling it ‘law.’” Or 
they may agree to talk about international law as if it were law, a sort of quasi-law or near-
law. But it cannot be true law, they maintain, because it cannot be enforced: how do you 
enforce a rule of law against an entire nation, especially a superpower such as the United 
States. . . ?  
Anthony D’Amato, Is International Law Really ‘Law’?, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1293 (1985). 
 7. Robert C. Hughes notes that while many legal philosophers have questioned the view that 
coercion is central and necessary for law, this view continues to be presupposed within political 
philosophy. See Robert C. Hughes, Law and Coercion, 8 PHIL. COMPASS 231 (2013). Two recent 
articles within legal philosophy that defend the coercive feature of law are Frederick Schauer, Was 
Austin Right after All? On the Role of Sanctions in a Theory of Law, 23 RATIO JURIS, 1 (2010), and 
Yankah, supra note 5.  
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or a supranational system of coercive sanctions. And second, one can 
reject the claim that coercive enforcement is required for law. Many 
scholars have defended international law by using the first strategy. While 
some argue that international law is sufficiently coercive since states can 
enforce it through military action and economic sanctions, others argue 
that compliance with international law can be achieved through less 
coercive means, and even through non-coercive means. I will focus on the 
second response, and I will consider broader conceptual issues regarding 
the connection between law and coercive enforcement.  
I will begin by providing an overview of the main positions and 
arguments on this issue. In the second part, I will challenge the assumption 
that coercive enforcement is central and necessary for law by supporting 
H.L.A. Hart’s argument against John Austin’s command theory of law. 
While Hart’s argument shows that sanctions are neither central to nor 
sufficient for law, he does not argue that sanctions are not a necessary 
feature of law. To defend this stronger claim, I will appeal to Joseph Raz’s 
view in the third part. I will also consider recent objections to Hart and 
Raz by Frederick Schauer and Ekow N. Yankah.  
In the fourth and fifth parts, I will consider whether supranational 
coercive enforcement may nonetheless be required to increase the 
effectiveness of international law or for normative reasons. In response to 
the former, I will argue that it is important to keep such instrumental 
considerations distinct from the question of what is required for rules, 
norms, practices and institutions to qualify as “law,” and secondly, I will 
argue that there are significant problems with the use of centralized 
coercive sanctions in the international case that may not in fact make it as 
effective as is often assumed.  
Finally, I will address what is required to have law at the international 
level. If not coercive enforcement, then what? I propose that the most 
important elements for regarding international law as law and for 
developing the rule of law at the global level include the following: first, 
states and officials that administer and apply international law must 
generally accept that international law is binding on them. This provides 
reasons to focus more on increasing the perceived legitimacy of 
international law rather than on developing stronger sanctions. And 
second, there must be impartial and independent adjudicative and 
administrative bodies with the recognized authority to determine and apply 
legal rules. While various kinds of enforcement may be needed to increase 
the effectiveness of international law in practice, the authoritative and 
impartial application of law should be seen as having primary importance 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol8/iss1/2
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since it is necessary for determining when and how enforcement can be 
used. 
I. OVERVIEW OF THE MAIN OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES 
I will refer to the argument that international law does not constitute a 
real legal system because it lacks certain features that are considered to be 
necessary for law (such as centralized coercive enforcement), as the Legal 
Nihilist argument.
8
 John Austin is an example of this view. According to 
Austin’s conception of law, rules must be enforced by a sovereign power 
in order to be law. Since international rules are not enforced, he concludes 
that they are not law, by definition.
9
 The Realist view of international 
relations is even more skeptical about international law. It regards the 
relation between states as a perpetual Hobbesian state of nature in which 
states act solely based on their interests. Under the Realist view, while 
states may agree to be bound by certain treaties and rules of international 
law, they comply with these rules and treaties only when it serves their 
interests and not because they are under any obligation to do so.
10
 This 
goes further because the Legal Nihilist could still hold that there are 
obligations between states, but that without external coercive enforcement, 
these obligations are merely self-binding moral obligations rather than 
externally binding legal obligations.
11
 The Realist argues that states are 
neither bound by legal nor moral obligations to comply with international 
legal rules and institutions; states only act in accordance with international 
law when it is in their interest to do so.
12
  
The common response to the coercive enforcement objection by 
international legal scholars has been to argue that even without a 
 
 
 8. Allen Buchanan uses this term for this view. ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 46 (2005). 
 9. See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 21 (1995).  
 10. Hans J. Morgenthau is the most influential twentieth century proponent of political realism in 
international relations. HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR 
POWER AND PEACE (6th ed. 1985); and HANS J. MORGENTHAU, IN DEFENSE OF THE NATIONAL 
INTEREST: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (1951). Other influential 
realists include E.H. Carr, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Kenneth Waltz (a neorealist). See KENNETH WALTZ, 
THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979). More recently, this view has been defended by Jack L 
Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner. See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005). They analyze international politics based on rational choice theory.  
 11. This view is most clearly presented by John Austin. Jürgen Habermas also makes this 
argument in his criticism of Kant’s proposal for a voluntary league of states. See Jürgen Habermas, 
Kant’s Idea of Perpetual Peace, with the Benefit of Two Hundred Years’ Hindsight, in PERPETUAL 
PEACE: ESSAYS ON KANT’S COSMOPOLITAN IDEAL 113 (James Bohman & Matthias Lutz-Bachmann 
eds., 1997). 
 12. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 10.  
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supranational enforcement body, international law is still coercively 
enforced by states in a decentralized way. Although Kelsen considered law 
to be a coercive order that must be backed by sanctions, he regarded war 
and reprisals by states against other states as providing the necessary 
coercive element for law at the international level.
13
 He believed that 
appropriate sanctions for the violation of international law could be 
determined by just war theory.
14
 According to the UN Charter, the 
Security Council can authorize states to use forcible measures to enforce 
international law and to maintain or restore peace and security.
15
 While 
this seems like a good example of coercive enforcement, in practice, the 
power of the Security Council in this respect has been severely limited 
since the Council has been deadlocked by the veto power of its five 
permanent members. International law also includes the use of non-
forcible countermeasures such as economic and trade sanctions in 
response to states that breach their treaty obligations.
16
 Given the non-
uniform way these coercive measures are used, particularly since they rely 
on the willingness of states to use force or impose economic or trade 
sanctions, some skeptics are not satisfied with this response. Realists point 
out that states are only willing to take such action when it serves their own 
national interests, such as when there are other reasons for military action 
or trade sanctions that will benefit them.
17
 This does not constitute the 
genuine enforcement of legal rules.  
 
 
 13. HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1952); Hans Kelsen, Sanctions in 
International Law Under the Charter of the United Nations, 31 IOWA L. REV. 499 (1946). 
 14. He defines a sanction as “a coercive act provided for as the consequence of a definite conduct 
of the state, a forcible interference in the normally protected sphere of interests of the state responsible 
for this conduct.” Kelsen, Principles of International Law, supra note 13, at 19. In the case of 
individuals, interferences in the normally protected spheres include depriving one of life, freedom and 
property. In the international case, sanctions include military action, confiscating property, and 
nonfulfillment of treaty obligations in relation to a state that has violated international law. Id. at 24. 
 15. Only the Security Council can authorize the use of coercive force to enforce international 
law. The Charter prohibits the use of force by states except for self-defence and collective self-defence 
against attacks subject to the authority of the Security Council to take action to maintain or restore 
peace and security. U.N. Charter art. 51.  
 16. Under customary international law, states can use a variety of non-forcible countermeasures, 
such as trade embargoes, freezing of assets, and the suspension of performance of treaty obligations in 
response to states that breach their treaty obligations. Non-forcible countermeasures to a state’s breach 
of its treaty obligations are part of customary international law, and they have been recognized as such 
by International Court. There are four recognized conditions on the use of non-forcible 
countermeasures: (1) they must be intended to obtain redress for the wrong committed; (2) prior 
notification of the countermeasures and their purposes must be given; (3) they must be proportionate to 
the violations complained of; and (4) countermeasures which affect individuals are subject to certain 
limits deriving from human rights standards which form part of general international law. IAN 
BROWNLIE, THE RULE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 135 (1998). 
 17. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 10, at 28–29.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol8/iss1/2
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Some contemporary international legal scholars have argued that it is a 
mistake to think of enforcement solely in terms of military action and 
economic sanctions. They argue that there are non-coercive means of 
increasing compliance with international law, such as through political 
pressure and the force of public opinion.
18
 For example, Scott Shapiro and 
Oona Hathaway have recently responded to the coercive enforcement 
objection by arguing that international legal institutions typically deploy 
“external outcasting” rather than physical force to enforce international 
legal rules.
19
 Member states can increase compliance with international 
law by simply denying the benefits of social cooperation and membership 
to disobedient states. This kind of response would be stronger if we could 
first challenge the underlying assumption that coercion is an essential or 
necessary feature for law.  
This leads us to the second line of response to the coercive enforcement 
objection—the argument that coercive sanctions are not a necessary or 
central feature of law, even within domestic legal systems.
20
  
II. HART’S ARGUMENT AGAINST COERCION-BASED THEORIES OF LAW 
AND HIS CONTRIBUTION TO LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 
A. The Command Theory of Law: Hobbes & Austin 
The view that effective, centralized enforcement through coercive 
sanctions is required for law is most strongly defended by Thomas Hobbes 
and John Austin. According to Hobbes, law is not counsel but commands 
backed by force: commands of a supreme sovereign addressed to those 
who are obliged to obey him. For Hobbes, the purpose of law is to provide 
order, stability, and certainty. There is the constant threat of war between 
individuals in the state of nature because, as individuals pursue their own 
interests, conflicts between them are inevitable, and each person will have 
her own conception of what is right.  
Hobbes argues that in order to leave this state of insecurity, a supreme 
sovereign is needed to conclusively determine what the laws are, to apply 
the laws to particular cases and settle conflicts, and to enforce these laws 
through the threat of force. In an important passage, Hobbes writes that 
 
 
 18. Richard Falk argues that the civil society can provide “normative restraint” and force states 
to comply with their international obligations. RICHARD FALK, REVITALIZING INTERNATIONAL LAW 
100 (1989). 
 19. Hathaway & Shapiro, supra note 1, at 258.  
 20. See BUCHANAN, supra note 8. See also ANTHONY D’AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
PROSPECT AND PROCESS (1987). 
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there can be no covenants without the sword.
 21
 Without a sovereign power 
with the capacity and authority to enforce contracts with the threat of 
punishment, individuals will have good reason to violate their agreements 
and the rights of others when it is in their best interest to do so, and when 
they can get away with it without suffering negative consequences. 
Hobbes has a prudential account of obligation. He argues that we cannot 
be obligated to do something that is contrary to our interests. If you and I 
make a contract, it is not rational for me to comply with my own 
contractual promises without any effective assurance that you will respect 
our agreement, since I would be acting against my own interests. The 
threat of punishment gives everyone a reason to comply, and 
consequently, it gives each individual effective assurance that others will 
follow their agreements. The same argument applies to any social contract 
between people. In order for us to be obligated to follow any rules, the 
rules must be first enforced by a sovereign power.  
John Austin similarly conceives of law as commands by an 
“uncommanded commander” backed by the threat of sanctions.22 Like 
Hobbes, he believes that it is the sanction itself that creates the obligation, 
and that without the sanction, there is no legal obligation. He writes that 
commands not backed by sanctions are not properly called laws.
23
 Austin 
concludes that international law is not law but “positive morality” because 
it lacks coercive sanctions.
24
  
 
 
 21. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 196 (1968) (“For he that performs first has no assurance the 
other will perform after; because the bonds of words are too weak to bridle men’s ambition, avarice, 
anger, and other Passions, without the fear of some coercive Power. . . . But in a civil estate, where 
there is a Power set up to constrain those that would otherwise violate their faith, that fear is no more 
reasonable; and for that cause, he which by the Covenant is to perform first, is obliged so to do.”). 
 22. Austin argues that a “command is distinguished from other significations of desire, not by the 
style in which the desire is signified, but by the power and the purpose of the party commanding to 
inflict an evil or pain in case the desire be disregarded.” See AUSTIN, supra note 9, at 21.  
 23. Id. at 33, 135–36.  
 24. Id. at 171. The term “positive morality” refers to the de facto moral rules that happen to exist 
in international society. A.V. Dicey similarly described international law as consisting of “rules of 
public ethics, which are miscalled international law.” A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF 
THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 22 (1915); cited in Simon Chesterman, An International Rule of 
Law?, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 331, 336 (2008). 
As I noted above, this assessment of international law has also been presented by Habermas in his 
article on Kant’s “Perpetual Peace.” Based on Kant’s legal theory, Habermas argues that legal 
obligations must be externally binding. Since international law lacks supranational coercive sanctions, 
he concludes that it can only create voluntary or self-binding moral obligations and not distinctively 
legal obligations. Habermas, supra note 11. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol8/iss1/2
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B.  Hart’s Response: There is More to Law than Commands Backed by 
Force 
Hart’s persuasive rejection of Austin’s command theory of law can be 
used to challenge coercion-based views of law.
25
 Hart argues that while 
the view of law as commands backed by threats has some affinities and 
connections with law, there is a danger of exaggerating this connection 
and obscuring the special features that distinguish law from other means of 
social control.
26
 According to Hart, Austin’s theory views law as similar to 
the situation of a gunman saying to his victim, “[g]ive me your money or 
your life,” except that in this case, the gunman says it to a large number of 
people who are used to this and habitually surrender their money to such 
threats. Hart argues there is more to law.
27
 While criminal law consists 
largely of rules that are like commands, rules that enable individuals to 
make contracts, wills, and trusts are not designed to obstruct antisocial 
behavior. Rather than saying “do this regardless of whether you want to or 
not,” they say “if you wish to do this, this is the way to do it.” 
Constitutional legal rules that constrain government action also do not fit 
the command model of law. For example, when a government’s legislation 
violates a constitutional law, a court can nullify that legislation, but it does 
not use a coercive mechanism or the threat of sanctions to force the 
government to do this. 
More importantly, the command theory of law distorts the role of 
obligation and duty in legal discourse. Hart argues that it identifies the 
normative idea of “having an obligation” or “being bound” with the 
observation that one is “likely to suffer the sanction or punishment 
threatened for disobedience.”28 Even in domestic law, where there are 
effective organized sanctions, Hart argues that we have to distinguish the 
variety of reasons given for the obligations created by law. He emphasizes 
the importance of the internal perspective by which legal rules are 
accepted as guiding standards of behaviour.
29
 He recognizes that rules that 
give rise to obligations or duties generally call for some sacrifice of private 
interests and are generally supported by serious demands for conformity 
 
 
 25. As Buchanan argues, to deny international law the title of “law” because it lacks a Hobbesian 
enforcement agent is to assume a now discredited Austinian conception of law and to ignore the 
realities of systems that certainly deserve the title of legal system. BUCHANAN, supra note 8, at 47. 
 26. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 213 (1997). 
 27. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 603 
(1958). 
 28. HART, The Concept of Law, supra note 26, at 218. 
 29. Id. 
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and insistent criticisms of deviations. However, he argues that once we 
reject the conception of law as essentially an order backed by threat, there 
seems no good reason for limiting the normative idea of obligation to rules 
supported by organized coercive sanctions.
30
  
While the command theory of law emphasizes obedience based on the 
fear of sanctions, Hart emphasizes the importance of the normative aspect 
of law from the internal perspective: the idea that individuals and officials 
are bound by legal rules because they accept these rules as valid legal 
rules and hence, as binding.
31
 They take themselves to be under an 
obligation to obey laws that are created in the manner that is recognized to 
be authoritative. This provides a better account of legal obligations 
because it is the acceptance of valid legal rules as binding that justifies the 
enforcement of law, and not the other way around.
32
 While sanctions are 
normally used to reinforce legal duties, the mistake that Hobbes and 
Austin make is to view the very existence of legal duties as dependent on 
sanctions.
33
 As Leslie Green argues:  
. . . the normal function of sanctions in the law is to reinforce duties, 
not to constitute them. It is true that one reason people are interested 
in knowing their legal duties is to avoid sanctions, but this is not the 
only reason nor is it, contrary to what Oliver Wendell Holmes 
supposed, a theoretically primary one. Subjects also want to be 
guided by their duties—whether in order to fulfill them or 
deliberately to infringe them—and officials invoke them as reasons 
for, and not merely consequences of, their decisions.
34
 
The fact that domestic laws are enforced provides one reason why 
individuals obey the law, but it is not what makes them law, and it is not 
the reason they are binding.  
 
 
 30. Id. 
 31. According to Hart, it is not necessary to answer the question of why people ought to obey the 
law in a foundational way. The motives for voluntarily supporting the rules of a legal system may be 
extremely diverse. While a legal order may be at its healthiest when there is a generally diffused sense 
that it is morally obligatory to conform to it, nonetheless, adherence to law may not be motivated by it, 
but by calculations of long-term interest, or by a desire to continue a tradition, or by disinterested 
concern for others. Hart argues that there is no good reason for identifying any of these as a necessary 
condition of the existence of law among individuals or states. Id. at 231–32. 
 32. According to Hobbes’ prudential account of obligation, we are only under an obligation to 
obey laws when they are externally enforced against all because we are not obligated to act contrary to 
our own interests. HOBBES, supra note 21.  
 33. HART, supra note 26, at 217–18.  
 34. Leslie Green, Legal Obligation, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Winter 2003 
ed.). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol8/iss1/2
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For Hart, the idea that a law is binding on us means the legal rule is 
valid and we can be said to have some obligation under it. The issue then 
is whether the rules of international law can meaningfully be said to give 
rise to obligations.
35
 What matters is that states and other agents take 
themselves to be under obligations of international law, and that officials, 
such as judges on domestic and international courts and officials of 
international institutions, take states and themselves to be bound by 
international law. As Hart states, “the proof that ‘binding’ rules in any 
society exist, is simply that they are thought of, spoken of, and function as 
such.”36  
Many theorists of international law similarly argue that what makes 
international law “law” is not whether it is analogous to domestic law or 
whether its rules are enforced through sanctions, but whether states 
themselves accept international law as binding.
37
 As Hart notes, in the 
practice of states, certain rules are regularly respected at the cost of certain 
sacrifices, claims are formulated by reference to them, and breaches of the 
rules expose the offender to serious criticism and are held to justify claims 
for compensation or retaliation. There is a complex web of international 
legal rules that receive a high degree of compliance, such as international 
laws concerning telecommunication, postal services, banking, aerial 
navigation, trade, and the law of the sea. International legal scholars often 
cite Louis Henkin’s statement that “almost all nations observe almost all 
principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all 
of the time.”38  
 
 
 35. Questions about the binding character of international law express a doubt about the general 
legal status of international law, not its applicability. He argues that a better way to formulate the 
question is “can such rules as these be meaningfully and truthfully said ever to give rise to 
obligations?” HART, supra note 26, at 216. 
 36. Id. at 231. Hart suggests that an important feature of a legal system is that its subjects and 
administrators regard legal rules as binding on them, even though their reasons and motives for this 
may differ. Hart points to various elements in the relations of states that support the statement that 
there are rules among states that impose obligations upon them. Hart notes that rules could not exist or 
function in the relations between states unless a significant majority of states accepted the rules and 
voluntarily co-operated in maintaining them. While he acknowledges that the pressure exercised on 
those who break or threaten to break the rules is often relatively weak, and has usually been 
decentralized and unorganized, he argues that, as in the case of individuals who voluntarily accept the 
far more coercive system of domestic law, the motives for voluntarily supporting such a system may 
be extremely diverse: adherence to a particular law may be motivated by a general moral obligation to 
act in accordance with the law, by calculations of long-term interest, or by the desire to continue a 
tradition or by concern for others, and some may be motivated by the fear of punishment. 
 37. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003). See also MARTIN DIXON, TEXTBOOK ON 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (4th ed. 2005) 
 38. LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 47 (2d ed. 1979).  
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Unfortunately, we get quite a different impression when we see states 
violating fundamental rules of international law, such as aggressive action 
against other states, torture, and genocide. However, even when states 
oppose interference in their internal affairs, they often appeal to basic 
principles in international law, such as the internal sovereignty of states. 
Even when states take aggressive actions against other states, they try to 
justify their actions as in accordance with international principles 
regarding the right to self-defense. As in the domestic case, the fact that 
laws are generally recognized as binding does not guarantee that actors 
will always comply with all particular laws. The fact that some agents 
violate certain laws does not prove that those laws are not generally 
recognized as binding. 
Based on Hart’s account, there is a second factor that makes the rules 
of international law legally binding: they must come into being in the 
manner accepted and recognized as authoritative. 
C. The Role of Secondary Rules  
What does it mean for a legal rule to be valid? For Hart, the special 
features of law that distinguish it from other means of social control are 
best understood through the union of primary and secondary rules.
39 
Primary rules are rules of conduct that confer obligations on individuals, 
such as criminal law. Secondary rules are power-conferring rules that are 
addressed to officials. They set out rules for the creation, recognition, 
change, and adjudication of primary rules. The most important kind of 
secondary rule is the rule of recognition—the most fundamental, basic rule 
of a legal system that is accepted at least by the officials who administer 
the legal system as specifying the sources of law and the criteria for 
determining whether a rule has legal validity.  
Hart makes an important contribution to legal and political philosophy 
by proposing the idea of a foundational rule of legal validity.
 
Against the 
modern idea of the supreme sovereign that is outside the law and against 
Austin’s idea of the “uncommanded commander,” Hart argues that 
legislators are constrained by foundational legal rules that specify law-
 
 
 39. In his analysis of law, Hart contrasts a developed legal system with the union of primary and 
secondary rules against a more primitive society of individuals that only has primary rules of 
obligations. He treats the existence of this characteristic union of rules as a sufficient condition for the 
application of the expression “legal system,” but he does not claim that the word “law” must be 
defined in these terms. Hart offers an elucidation of the concept of law, rather than a definition of 
“law” which could provide rules for the use of this term. HART, supra note 26, at 213.  
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making procedures.
40
 As David Dyzenhaus argues, this distinguishes 
legitimate legal authority from arbitrary political power, and it places 
restrictions on law-makers and legal administrators concerning their 
creation and application of the law.
41
 The ultimate source of law then is 
not the sovereign’s will but foundational legal rules. Rather than the rule 
of man, or the rule of a sovereign that is above the law, we have the rule of 
law as the ultimate source of political authority.
42
  
One of the reasons why Hobbes argues for a supreme sovereign that is 
not subject to any other authority is to conclusively resolve issues of 
indeterminacy that arise from conflicts and from the application of law to 
particular cases. For Hobbes, the sovereign’s authority must be supreme 
because if another body could question the sovereign’s actions, then the 
problem of indeterminacy arises again.
43
 This is part of Hobbes’s reasons 
for rejecting a right to rebel: we need a sovereign that has the final say.  
For Hart, the source of law is not the sovereign’s will but the secondary 
rules, and if a government violates these in its actions, then these actions 
do not have the normative force of law; they are brute force. This idea is 
particularly important in the international case. Instead of resting the 
ultimate source of law with a sovereign global legislative and executive 
body, the legitimacy and authority of international law can rest on its own 
foundational principles. These foundational secondary rules also provide a 
determinate and authoritative way by which international legal rules are 
created, identified, and applied.  
D. Problems With Hart’s View of International Law 
One of the challenges with using Hart’s theory to make the case that 
international law is indeed law is that Hart believed that international law 
lacked secondary rules of change and adjudication which provide for 
legislature and courts in international law, as well as a unifying rule of 
recognition which specifies the sources of law and provides general 
criteria for the identification of its rules.
44
 Based on Hart’s conception of a 
 
 
 40. Hans Kelsen introduced a similar idea before Hart. He argued that the legal order was based 
on a Grundnorm or basic norm. Kelsen, supra note 13, at 446. 
 41. David Dyzenhaus, The Justice of the Common Law: Judges, Democracy and the Limits of the 
Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW (Cheryl Saunders & Katherine Le Roy eds., 2003).  
42. Hart would probably take issue with this analysis of the implications of his theory since he 
argues that his conception of law is a merely descriptive and has no such normative implications. I am 
grateful to Lars Vinx for raising this point. Regardless of what Hart intended, I think these are 
important normative implications of his theory.  
 43. Kant presents a similar view. See Kant, supra note 3. 
 44. HART, supra note 26, at 214. 
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domestic legal system as a union of primary and secondary rules, this 
seems to lead to the conclusion that international law is not a legal system 
since it lacks secondary rules. Instead, it is a simple or primitive form of 
social structure that consists only of primary rules of obligation. 
Hart tries to avoid this conclusion. Since he criticizes those who take 
domestic law to be paradigmatic of law and then evaluate international law 
through an adverse comparison with domestic law, he tries to avoid 
making this mistake himself.
45
 Consequently, since he develops his 
conception of a legal system by analyzing domestic legal systems, he 
admits that there may be problems with applying his conception of law as 
the union of primary and secondary rules to decide the issue of whether 
international law is really law.  
I disagree with Hart on this issue. I think the development and 
clarification of such foundational rules of legal validity is particularly 
important for a more decentralized model of international law.
 
If we had a 
world parliament, then the test of validity for international laws could 
simply be whatever the world legislature passes according to recognized 
procedures. But if the creation of legal rules is more decentralized, then it 
is all the more important to have clear foundational rules regarding the 
sources and validity of international legal rules and obligations.  
Significant secondary rules of change and adjudication already exist in 
international law. For example, the Vienna Convention on Treaties 
codifies pre-existing international customary norms that govern the 
formation and effect of treaties.
46
 This provides secondary rules of change 
since it defines what is required to make a treaty valid. Article 38 of the 
statute that created the International Court of Justice provides secondary 
rules of adjudication and also lists various sources of law.
47
 Article 38 
states that the Court should apply international conventions, international 
customary law, the general principles of law recognized by states, and 
juristic writings in settling disputes between states. Such secondary rules 
need to be developed further, but what exists so far is sufficient for a 
workable system of law.
48
 
This issue points to another limitation with appealing to Hart’s theory 
to defend a decentralized model of international law against the 
 
 
 45. Id. at 216. 
 46. Signed in 1969. See 2 U.N. Conf. on L. Treatises 289 (1969). 
 47. Established in 1946. See Statute of Int’l Court of Justice art. 38. 
 48. Samantha Besson considers how customary international law can also be regarded as part of 
international law’s secondary rules. SAMANTHA BESSON, Theorizing the Sources of International Law, 
in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas eds., 2010). 
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enforcement-based objection. Hart doubts that secondary rules exist in 
international law because his conception of secondary rules is too 
centralized and too hierarchical, particularly his suggestion that there is an 
ultimate rule of recognition that unifies a legal system. However, even in 
domestic legal systems, it is difficult to determine a single ultimate rule of 
recognition. Instead, there are various interrelated practices, institutions, 
rules, and agreements regarding the creation and application of law that 
emerge over time and become generally accepted and recognized by 
officials and even citizens to some extent. It is tempting to believe that a 
legal system’s ultimate rule of recognition is its constitution or founding 
document, but the legal validity of the constitution must rest on something 
else. Because Hart bases his theory of law on secondary rules and the role 
of government officials, he has been criticized for still viewing law as a 
one-way projection of authority; instead of grounding law on a supreme 
sovereign authority (as Hobbes and Austin do), law is grounded on a 
hierarchy of rules.
49
 By comparison, Lon Fuller provides a less 
hierarchical and more interactive or reciprocal conception of law. For 
Fuller, law depends neither on force, nor the exercise of authority, nor a 
hierarchy of rules; rather, law depends on the effective cooperation 
between citizens and lawmaking and law-applying officials.
50
 Fuller 
provides a richer understanding of law.  
While this interactive conception of law is present in Hart’s theory to 
some extent, it is limited. For example, Hart states that what makes 
international legal rules binding is that the subjects of international law 
(states, individuals, and other agents) recognize international law as 
binding on them. Those who support more interactive and constructivist 
theories of law criticize Hart’s focus on rules instead of recognizing the 
important role of legal process and dialogue. They also criticize his focus 
on the perspective of officials rather than on the perspective of the subjects 
of law. Instead of focusing on whether there is an ultimate rule of 
recognition that can provide an ultimate ground for law’s validity, it is 
more important to consider the recognition and acceptance of law by its 
subjects.  
In order for international law to provide determinacy so that it can 
guide and coordinate behavior in ways that are less susceptible to 
 
 
 49. Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 
630 (1958). Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J. Toope develop Fuller’s criticism of Hart in their analysis of 
international law. JUTTA BRUNNÉE & STEPHEN J. TOOPE, LEGITIMACY AND LEGALITY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN INTERACTIONAL ACCOUNT (2010).  
 50. Id. at 23.  
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problems of bias and power politics, it is important to develop 
authoritative and impartial adjudicative and administrative institutions. 
Ultimately, however, the parties and subjects of international law (states, 
individuals, corporations, global and transnational organizations) must 
recognize international law as binding, and they must accept the authority 
of judicial and administrative institutions to determine what international 
law requires.  
III. GOING BEYOND HART: IS COERCIVE ENFORCEMENT A NECESSARY 
FEATURE OF LAW?  
There is an important objection that can be raised against my use of 
Hart to address the coercive enforcement view against international law. 
One can argue that while Hart was correct to criticize Austin’s and 
Hobbes’ reductive view of law as commands by an “uncommanded 
commander” backed by the threat of sanctions, this does not support the 
conclusion that sanctions are not conceptually necessary for law; it only 
proves that they are not sufficient and that other features are required as 
well. One may agree with Hart that a system of commands backed by 
threat alone does not constitute a legal system and that Austin’s focus on 
sanctions leads to an inadequate understanding of legal obligations. 
However, one can argue that the claim that coercive sanctions are not 
conceptually necessary for law goes too far. One can agree that there is 
more to law than Austin’s “commands backed by sanctions” but still hold 
that coercive sanctions and other forms of coercion are required for law 
and for legally binding obligations; law may still be inherently coercive.
51
 
This objection seems quite persuasive since all legal systems seem to 
depend on the widespread use of sanctions. However, while the use of 
coercive sanctions to enforce law is common to all modern legal systems, 
is it conceptually necessary for law? Is it possible to have law or a legal 
system without coercive sanctions? Can one imagine a legal system 
without coercion? If so, what would be the purpose of law in such a 
system? 
A. Raz and The Society of Angels Thought Experiment 
I want to go further than Hart and argue that while coercive sanctions 
are commonly used in modern legal systems, they are not conceptually 
necessary for law. Joseph Raz provides a good argument for this view. 
 
 
 51. See Schauer, supra note 7; Yankah, supra note 5. 
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Raz imagines a society of angels in which all members act according to 
what they think is right. They pursue their self-interests when they think it 
right to do so (they are not self-denying), but they may be wrong about 
what is right.
52
 We see this idea in the discussion of the state of nature in 
Locke and Hobbes: no matter how morally good and honorable 
individuals may be, there will still be disagreement about what is right. 
Even if all members of a society are morally good, even if they all want to 
honor their agreements and respect the rights of others, they may 
nonetheless unintentionally harm others or violate the rights of others by 
accident or due to ignorance. Conflicts will still arise and there may be 
more than one way to settle certain conflicts. Law is required then to set 
down general rules for all, to determine people’s remedial rights and 
duties, and to settle conflicts by applying these general rules to particular 
cases. This highlights the central role of adjudication in a legal system. 
There needs to be some authority to create, interpret, and apply general 
laws. 
If all members of this ideal society are motivated by these general rules 
and the authority of certain institutions to adjudicate particular conflicts, 
and if these are regarded as normative obligations that bind them, then 
punitive, coercive sanctions are not necessary. Though members of this 
society will still have to pay compensation if they unintentionally harm 
others, this differs from punitive sanctions that are intended to deter law-
breakers.
53
 Punitive sanctions are only needed when individuals refuse to 
comply with what the law requires or what a judge orders. In such 
circumstances, the threat of coercion both motivates compliance and 
provides assurance that others will also comply. In the case of human 
beings (who are not angels), being arrested, imprisoned, and compelled to 
pay fines works quite well to fulfill this purpose, even though these are not 
effective enough to achieve full compliance. 
Based on this example, Raz concludes that a sanctionless legal system 
is logically possible but humanly impossible.
54
 While it may seem strange 
to address this issue by appealing to the legal system of an imaginary 
society of angels, this example suggests that some other explanation of the 
normativity of laws is needed. As Raz argues, the sanction-based attempt 
to explain the normativity of the law leads to a dead end; it explains one 
way in which laws provide reasons for action, but fails to explain in what 
 
 
 52. JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 157–62 (1999).  
 53. Id. at 160.  
 54. Id. at 158.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
   
 
 
 
 
 
52 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 8:35 
 
 
 
 
way they are norms.
55
 If law is not necessarily or inherently coercive, even 
though coercive public sanctions are needed as a practical matter to deal 
with the problem of non-compliance, this alters the way we think of law 
and legal obligations. It is important to keep these practical and 
instrumental considerations distinct from the conceptual question of what 
is law and what is required for a legal obligation.  
Schauer and Yankah criticize Raz’s approach of determining the 
essential features of law. Instead of considering what is theoretically 
possible, they argue that legal theory should aim at illuminating law as it 
exists and as it is experienced. In their view, coercion is of central 
importance to existing modern systems of law and to people’s experience 
of law.
56
 Their approach limits the role of legal theory and the possibilities 
for law. While it is important to identify and understand the dominant 
features of current domestic legal systems, it is also important to consider 
whether these features may be contingent on certain circumstances, or 
whether they are essential features of law. We should be careful not to 
limit our conception of law to practices that happen to be predominant in 
existing domestic legal systems. This approach could be used to prejudge 
whether other systems of rules or practices (such as international law) 
constitute law. We also must be able to ask whether coercion is the best 
way for law to achieve the purposes that we think law ought to achieve. 
For example, given the high personal and social costs of mass 
incarceration, it is important to question the connection between law and 
coercion and to ask whether there are non-coercive or less coercive ways 
of increasing compliance.  
B. What then Distinguishes Legal Obligations from Moral and Other 
Obligations?  
Schauer and Yankah also argue that in understanding the concept of 
law, it is important to consider what distinguishes law from other 
normative systems, and what distinguishes legal obligation from other 
kinds of obligations, such as moral and religious obligations. Since the 
right to use coercive sanctions is an important distinctive feature of law, 
they argue that a coercion-free account of law or legal obligation is 
defective.
57
 This view is appealing because in a liberal society, using 
public coercion to enforce legal obligations is justifiable, but using public 
 
 
 55. Id. at 162. 
 56. Yankah, supra note 5, at 1240. See also Schauer, supra note 7, at 17–18. 
 57. Id. 
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coercion to enforce moral or religious obligations is not. If one thinks that 
international law is not sufficiently enforced through coercive sanctions, 
then why is international law not simply a system of morality, as Austin 
and Habermas have claimed? Why not conceive of treaty obligations 
simply as a kind of moral obligation, such as promise-keeping?  
While focusing on features of modern domestic legal systems that are 
pervasive and distinctive is illuminating for an analysis of domestic law, 
this approach does not conclusively answer the question of whether 
coercive sanctions are necessary in order for international law or any other 
system of rules and obligations to be “law.”  
First, non-legal and non-governmental institutions and organizations 
(such as religious institutions, academic institutions, employers, and social 
clubs) can also enforce their rules and increase compliance through 
various kinds of sanctions short of imprisonment, such as the threat of 
fines, disciplinary action, and having one’s membership or employment 
terminated or suspended. Therefore, the use of punitive sanctions is not 
unique to law.  
Second, even though it is true that the use of stronger coercive 
sanctions, such as imprisonment, is something that distinguishes domestic 
legal rules from other social rules, this is only true for some domestic 
laws. As discussed above, many laws are not enforced through coercive 
sanctions, such as constitutional law and the law of wills and estates.  
Third, we can distinguish between moral obligations and legal 
obligations on other grounds. For example, according to Hart, whether we 
have a legal obligation in a particular case is determined by whether there 
is a valid legal rule. This is determined by secondary rules. While 
individuals can make promises to each other that give rise to moral 
obligations, in order to create legal obligations, a promise or agreement 
between two people must accord with legal rules about what is required 
for a valid contract. This can be determined by a court of law. In the case 
of international law, rules, practices, and procedures have been developed 
to determine this, and international and domestic courts have the authority 
to determine this.  
There are important differences between the obligations created by 
international law and moral obligations that correspond to the distinction 
between law and morality in domestic law and that do not involve 
coercion. When states reproach each other for immoral conduct or praise 
themselves or others for living up to the standard of international morality, 
this moral appraisal is recognizably different from the formulation of 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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claims, demands, and the acknowledgements of rights and obligations 
under the rules of international law.
58
 What is predominate in the 
arguments states address to each other over disputed matters of 
international law are references to treaties, court judgments, and juristic 
writings. They are often very technical, and often, there is no mention of 
morally right or wrong, good or bad. For example, we can distinguish 
between whether NATO’s intervention in Kosovo was the morally right 
thing to do, and whether it nonetheless violated existing rules of 
international law. If we think that NATO violated the existing rules of 
international law, we may also think that the rules, procedures, and 
institutions of international law should be changed to better address such 
cases of humanitarian intervention.  
Why does maintaining this distinction matter? Law allows us to settle 
conflicts in a legitimate and authoritative way. It provides certainty, 
predictability, and order. It also allows individuals in a society to 
coordinate their behaviour. These goals are important in the international 
case as well. Rather than settling conflicts by mere brute force or the threat 
of force, states can settle their disputes according to accepted legal rules 
and before courts of law. The distinction between law and morality, 
between one’s legal and moral obligations, is particularly important to the 
extent that there is moral disagreement between individuals or societies 
that have different moral views.  
IV. IS COERCIVE ENFORCEMENT NONETHELESS NECESSARY FOR 
INSTRUMENTAL REASONS? 
So far, I have argued that coercive enforcement is not conceptually 
necessary for law or legal obligations. Sanctions may however be 
necessary as a practical matter to give individuals, states, and other actors 
additional incentives to comply with independently binding legal rules. I 
will briefly consider whether a centralized system of coercive sanctions is 
instrumentally necessary to increase compliance with international law.  
There are two problems with the objection that a decentralized model 
of international law is not effective enough to count as law. First, it is not 
clear what would count as sufficient effectiveness. It cannot be complete 
effectiveness or complete compliance since many people continue to break 
the law in the United States and countries with strong legal systems and 
 
 
 58. HART, supra note 26, at 228. 
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many escape legal punishment. Much of domestic law is not coercively 
enforced in practice.  
Second, there are significant factual differences between the use of 
coercive enforcement in the domestic case and the international case. It is 
easier to see why physical sanctions are possible and necessary in the case 
of individuals who are approximately equal in physical strength and 
vulnerability. They ensure that those who voluntarily submit to the 
restraints of law do not become victims of those who would, in the 
absence of sanctions, take advantage of others’ respect for the law while 
not respecting it themselves. Among individuals living in close proximity 
to each other, the opportunities for injuring others are great, as are the 
chances of escape, and consequently, natural deterrents and other reasons 
would not be adequate to restrain people from disobeying the law.
59
  
In the international case, the use of force against states is more 
complicated, less efficacious, and comes at a very high cost, especially 
with respect to human lives. First, would a supranational coercive body be 
able to enforce law in a safe and effective way? In the domestic case, the 
police can use force to arrest an individual with little risk of harm to 
others. However, the use of force against states is always public. When the 
violator of international law is a state, it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
direct sanctions solely against those who are responsible for violating 
international law. While this is most clear with the use of military action, 
economic sanctions can also cause serious harm against the poor and 
vulnerable populations of a state, including citizens who may in fact 
oppose their government’s violation of international law. As Hart argues, 
since the organization and use of sanctions internationally involves great 
risks, the threat of them adds little to other deterrents and reasons for 
compliance.
60
  
Second, natural deterrents and other reasons for compliance seem 
stronger in the international case, so the need for problematic coercive 
sanctions may not be as important as in the case of individuals. In the case 
of states, there are a limited number of actors and their actions are public 
in nature. To the extent that they must interact with each other in our 
globalized world and are dependent on future good relations with other 
states, this provides strong reasons to comply with their legal obligations, 
particularly their treaty obligations. If I sell a defective product to 
someone, that person will probably not want to interact with me again, but 
 
 
 59. Id. at 218–19. 
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I can find new customers. If word gets out, I can sell it under a different 
name or move to a new area. This is much more difficult for states to do. 
In addition, given the public nature of state actions, the condemnation of 
the violation of international law by international institutions, non-
governmental organizations, other states, and individual citizens has a 
stronger role in guiding behaviour than in the case of individuals in large 
societies where shame and social condemnation may have little or no 
effect.
61
 For example, as Hathaway and Shapiro show, international legal 
institutions have been able to increase compliance by denying the benefits 
of membership to disobedient states (“outcasting”).62  
Against this different factual background, international law has 
developed in a form different from that of domestic law. As Hart points 
out, given the large populations of modern states, if there were no 
organized repression and punishment of crime, violence and theft would 
be frequent occurrences. However, for states, long years of peace have 
intervened between disastrous wars. This is to be expected given the risks 
and stakes of war and the mutual needs of states.
63
 Even in the absence of 
a central enforcement body above states, what the rules of international 
law require is still thought and spoken of as “obligatory,” and there is still 
a general pressure for conformity to the rules.
64
 
V. NORMATIVE REASONS FOR A SUPRANATIONAL SYSTEM OF 
ENFORCEMENT 
I would like to briefly consider a final objection that also applies to the 
first line of response. Regardless of whether coercive enforcement is 
necessary for law, to the extent that international law is enforced in 
various decentralized ways, this raises a normative problem. Whether or 
not a state attempts to enforce international legal rules against another 
state may be based on a state’s own interests and the respective power of 
the states involved. If State A is powerful and State B is not, then State A 
can enforce international law against B, but B would not be able to enforce 
 
 
 61. Unfortunately such reasons may be less compelling for very powerful states and states that 
are less interdependent and less concerned with being part of an international community of states. 
 62. See supra note 1.  
 63. HART, supra note 26, at 220. 
 64. Id. When international rules are disregarded, it is usually not on the ground that international 
law is generally not “binding.” Instead, efforts are made to conceal the facts that these rules were 
broken, or efforts are made to argue against the applicability of a particular rule of international law. 
For example, the United States has tried to defend itself against the charge that the war on Iraq is a 
violation of international law by arguing that the right to self-defense in international law should be 
extended to include preemptive self-defense.  
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it against A. These factors undermine important norms that are associated 
with the rule of law, such as impartiality and universality. International 
legal rules do not seem to apply to all states equally.  
While this is an important concern, it is not a good reason for denying 
that international law is “law” or denying that the rule of law can exist 
internationally in the absence of a supranational coercive body. Instead, 
the rule of law ideal that the law should apply equally and impartially to 
all should guide the development of international legal rules and its 
institutions. I will briefly suggest a few ways that international law can 
begin to address these concerns without a coercive world government.  
First, and perhaps most importantly, international law cannot be said to 
apply equally to all states when five states have veto power over Security 
Council resolutions that authorize of the use of force, and when this body 
is often paralyzed by this. This needs to be reformed. And, second, in 
order to have the rule of law, sanctions and other means of enforcement 
ought only to be used in accordance with international legal rules. For 
example, the UN Charter defines when states can use force, such as in 
cases of self-defense, and international customary law sets out and limits 
the use of non-forcible countermeasures for the breach of treaties. While 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has adjudicated both kinds of 
cases, a major weakness of our current system of international law is that 
the ICJ does not have compulsory jurisdiction; instead, a state must 
voluntarily authorize the ICJ to settle a case involving itself. This 
illustrates the importance of developing and strengthening adjudicative 
institutions that will apply the rules of international law in a fair and 
impartial way. Impartial adjudicative institutions are needed to authorize 
and constrain any attempts by states or other agents to enforce the law.  
CONCLUSION 
The main aim of this Article has been to respond to the skeptical 
argument that without a centralized, supranational system of coercive 
enforcement that includes effective punitive sanctions, we cannot have law 
or legal obligations at the international level; at best, we can only have 
voluntary moral obligations. In my response, I first challenged the view 
that sanctions are a central and necessary feature of law (Parts II-III). 
Second, in response to the argument that coercive enforcement is 
nonetheless necessary for the effectiveness of law in practice, I argued that 
the use of coercion is less effective and more problematic in the 
international case (Part IV).  
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While others emphasize the importance of a strong supranational 
system of coercive enforcement for the development of a law-governed 
condition at the global level, my view is that the following are the most 
important elements for a viable system of law at the global level. First, 
states, international bodies, officials, and other agents must regard 
international legal rules as generally binding on them. This point was 
supported by Hart’s theory of law and his criticism of the command theory 
of law (Part II.B). Second, the criteria for the creation, adjudication and 
application of international legal rules must be clearly specified. I argued 
for this point in my criticism of Hart’s claim that international law lacks 
secondary rules (Part II.D). Third, the rules of international law must be 
determined and applied impartially by adjudicative bodies or other 
institutions with the accepted authority to do so, such as the International 
Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, the monitoring bodies 
of particular treaties, as well as domestic courts. I demonstrated the 
importance of this feature for law and the rule of law in my discussion of 
Raz’s argument (Part III.A), in my discussion of the distinction between 
moral and legal obligations (Part III.B), and in response to the normative 
concerns that are raised against decentralized means of enforcement (Part 
V).  
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